Reconstruction efforts

U.S. Forces set up camp in Ramadi in early May 2003. Since the 2nd BCT arrived in Sept 2004, media accounts suggest their focus has been primarily on security and offensive operations. In between May 2003 and Sept 2004, however, the Marines and soldiers have been involved in or supported several reconstruction efforts worthy of note. Thus, there are clearly some positives in the region.

In early 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority allocated $540 million for restoration projects in the Al Anbar province, with additional funding appropriated since.

Examples of documented reconstruction tasks in Ramadi:
- Street repairs to improve travel and eliminate raw sewage
- Training of Iraq Police Forces, including handcuffing procedures, first aid, communication, building clearing techniques, and weapons training.
- Establishing security and providing provisions for hospitals. (note this link is to a pdf document)
- Building and supporting schools
- Improving water treatment plants
- Training Iraqi youth on construction skills

On the down side, one official's quote from Knight Ridder newspapers: As of July 2004, "The U.S. military has poured about $18 million into reconstruction projects in Ramadi, but Neemeyer [A U.S. Military Intelligence Officer] said the projects hadn't done much in the way of winning people over."
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A thorough, bipartisan evaluation of Iraq's reconstruction efforts was conducted by a think-tank (Center for Strategic and International Studies). Iraqi citizens conducted interviews in July around several regions as part of the research. A lengthly 108 page report was published in Sept 2004 and can be downloaded as a pdf document here.

Some key quotes:
"Despite consistent criticism that the media portrays the situation in Iraq in an overly negative light, the media has not been significantly more negative than other sources of information on the issues of security, governance and participation, and economic opportunity. The media has been regularly more negative than other sources about services and social well-being issues. But in those areas, the media is arguably more balanced than public sources, in that it tends to include descriptions of the impact of security and reports of the Iraqi perspective."

"Iraqis remain grounded in realism and patient about the future; they have modest expectations about the reconstruction but grander ones about Iraq’s longer-term prospects. Iraqis are judging U.S. actions and achievements by several standards: in contrast to those of Saddam Hussein, in light of Iraq’s many desperate, unmet needs, and by what they assume U.S. wealth and power should be able to achieve."

"In the four towns we surveyed in al-Anbar province, security concerns related as much to the lawlessness of a region where justice is dispensed according to tribal customs as to any fighting between U.S. forces and insurgents."

"The United States prioritized equitable provision of services to regions throughout Iraq, meaning that regions favored during Saddam’s rule (Baghdad and al-Anbar in particular) have felt especially adversely affected after the war."

"The United States has yet to undertake a realistic assessment of what it will take to win urban battles in Iraq, at least not publicly. The al-Anbar region, with the volatile cities of Falluja and Ramadi, remains essentially off-limits to U.S. and coalition forces since they pulled out of Falluja in April. Reports suggest that terrorists, insurgents, and Islamic extremists have free rein in those cities, terrorizing the local population and those seen as sympathetic to the United States or Iraq’s new government.149 Since backing off in Falluja and Najaf last April, U.S. and Iraqi leaders seem to have determined that flattening cities is not a winning formula for rooting out insurgents. Although doing so might mean a short-term military victory, it has massive political costs as a consequence of civilian casualties and economic losses. An alternative is needed, but the standoff in Najaf in August would suggest that neither the U.S. military nor the Iraqi government has yet defined one."